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Abstract
Recent events in the US have focused attention on the fiduciary responsibility of
independent board members at a public or private company. This paper examines the
process of selecting board members at a high tech start-up where issues of investment in
innovation, conflict of interest, firm valuation, non-interference in direct management,
exit strategy and accounting practices can be difficult for an entrepreneurial team to
handle in a timely manner. Start-ups are in a unique position in that they have the
opportunity to initiate a board composition that not only can serve them well in the first
few years of business but can set the “tone” or “culture” for the expected levels of
ethical behavior in the entrepreneurial team. After reviewing the functions of board
members, a typology of candidates and general qualifications, suggestions are made to
the start-up’s entrepreneurial team in the form of a checklist for dealing with several of
these issues in board governance.
CHANGING ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Recent events in the US have focused attention on the fiduciary responsibility of board
members in a company. Questionable tactics in financial reporting at Enron, lucrative
executive compensation packages at Tyco and numerous reports of insider trading and
conflict of interest have eroded the confidence in the methodology of board oversight. In
the aftermath of recent corporate scandals, the spotlight has shown most brightly on
whom shareholders considered the most impartial of board members and who was
supposed to best represent their interests – the independent board member. The
independence was derived from several attributes: not being part of management or
related to any member of management; not having substantial financial investment in the
company; not doing business with the company; and not being able to accrue great
personal wealth from the company’s performance. Nevertheless, despite the
disappointment and due to the urging of institutional investors, companies have moved
towards having more and more independent directors. (Colman, 1994) However, there
are mixed reviews as to the value of the independent directors on the board in relation to
firm performance. (Lin, 1996) (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998) (Denis, 2001) The role
the board plays in corporate governance is certainly becoming more pronounced and the
board’s relationship with the CEO is also changing. (Pound, 1995)
Start-ups have the unique opportunity to begin corporate governance with principles that
have become important to shareholders – transparency, communications, standard and
widely accepted accounting rules, and the highest ethical standards. Although start-ups
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begin their corporate life almost without exception as private companies, many choose to
immediately follow SEC and NASDAQ rules about the role independent directors should
play in corporate governance. In this way, the corporate governance transition in going
from a private company to a public company would be smooth and with no need for
major alteration. There are many books and articles outlining the responsibilities of a
corporate board member, The Corporate Director’s Guidebook (1994) being an example.
However, few authors have addressed the methodology for the selection of board
members, especially in start-ups, let alone high tech start-ups.
Due to the recent adverse stock market conditions and the “witch hunt” now underway in
the US to ferret out unethical if not illegal behavior of company management and board
members, it is timely for the entrepreneurial team (“ET”) to place more importance on
board selection than ever before. Further, the selection process may become more
laborious than before due to the disinterest being generated in potential board members as
they see board membership as more “risky” than in the past. Director and Officer
(“D&O”) insurance policies, once relatively common in public but rare in private
companies, may become a requirement for a prospective board member of any stature,
wealth and reputation to join a company board. Few public companies have braved not
having D&O insurance in the past and fewer will dare continue not having such
protection.
Another reason for developing a corporate governance plan at a start-up centers on its
high risk of business failure in the early years. A strong board can assist in detecting and
attending to signs of business ailments (Scherrer, 2003). Assembling the right board can
also assist the high tech start-up in maintaining its focus on innovation and
commercialization processes. (Perel, 2002) High tech start-ups have the added business
hurdle to overcome of introducing a new technology to the market and achieving its
acceptance within a window of opportunity dictated primarily by the level of investment
and low competition.
FUNCTIONS OF A BOARD MEMBER
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes requirements on board governance as an
attempt to make more uniform board oversight of companies. Basic duties and
responsibilities were initially outlined in the Model Business Corporation Act of 1978.
(Model Act) However, over time five types of relationships have developed between the
board and the company: (a) Legalistic; (b) Agency; (c) Strategy and policy; (d) Advisory;
(e) Contributory. Four of these types are described in Ong and Lee (2000) as “theories”
that researchers have used linearly and individually to describe the functioning of the
board relative to the company. Little research has been done to model board influence on
company performance using even two of the relationships at the same time let alone all
five.
The five relationships or functions ascribed to board behavior in this paper are listed
below in similar form to that of Table 1 in Ong and Lee (2000). We will briefly discuss
the attributes of each relationship and the impact they may have in assembling a board for
a high tech start-up.
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Legal. The company board has powers and responsibilities endowed by its articles of
incorporation, corporate bylaws, federal and state statutes, or regulations passed down
from the SEC or stock exchanges.
Agency. The role of agency dates back to the expectation that owners and managers can
have a divergence of interests. (Berle and Means, 1932) In this light the primary job of
the board directors is to provide impartial and diligent oversight of a company’s
operation and management in the interest of all shareholders.
Strategy and Policy. As a result of performing its legal and oversight duties, the board
exercises judgment in evaluating business plans, investment opportunities and
organizational priorities. The process of evaluating and approving such major strategic
options of the company empowers the board in establishing strategy for the company.
(Zahra, 1990) Research has shown a positive correlation between board involvement in
corporate strategy and firm performance. (Pearce and Zahra, 1991)
Advisory. Board members are expected to perform in an advisory role to company
management. Large investors in a technology company, such as venture capitalists
(“VC’s”), at times insist on playing a major advisory role as board members, especially
with youthful and inexperienced management teams. VC’s can overplay this role to their
detriment if they fail to gain the trust of the entrepreneurial team early in their
association. (Besenitz, Moesel, Fiet and Barney, 1997)
Contributory. Board members do volunteer their services operationally in many ways
with or without additional compensation under the conditions that the time to complete
the service is not burdensome and that the service does not compromise their career or
current position. This relationship is attributed to a “stewardship” function of a board
member. (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1996)
TYPOLOGY OF BOARD MEMBERS
Investor. Anyone who has made a significant investment in the start-up frequently asks
for a board seat principally for the sake of “protecting” their investment. Venture
capitalists commonly ask for a restructuring of the board as they make an investment,
assuring themselves of enough board seats to reflect the size of investment being made in
the company. Depending on the limited partnership agreement governing the venture
capital firm, it is often the case that the VC partner him/herself has to sit on the board
associated with his/her “deal.”
Employee/Manager. It is common for managers or other employees, especially
founders, to request a board seat, frequently using the argument that they own
considerable stock and they have a significant stake in board decisions. Entrepreneurs can
find that the CEO’s membership is adequate for representing the interests of the
managers and other employees. Employees are obvious “insiders” who are biased in that
they tend to protect their jobs with the company.
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Relevant Stakeholder. Other stakeholders found on boards include customers, suppliers,
legal counsel, spouses of the CEO or other board members and family members.
Entrepreneurs are advised to avoid encouraging such candidates to join the board,
principally for avoiding conflict of interest.
The Independent Board Member. Extensive research has been conducted analyzing
company performance relative to board structure parameters such as number of insiders,
number of independent members, board compensation, etc. The motivation for such
research is obvious. It attempts to answer the question: “What kind of board is associated
with acceptable company performance? The consensus from this research, despite a weak
association, is to advocate for more independent board members (Barnhart and
Rosenstein, 1998) (Denis, 2001).
GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT BOARD MEMBERS
More variables that are ascribed to a board member on an individual basis that certainly
can influence company performance include (a) communications; (b) motivation; (c)
operations experience; (d) teamwork; (e) time. These attributes are especially important
for an entrepreneur to assess in a candidate for a board position.
Communications. One attribute that may portray the prospective board member’s true
temperament is that board member’s ability to communicate. Witnessing the would-be
board member’s oral presentations, especially in group meetings, and a review of some
his/her writings on business subjects can give insight into the individual’s mode of
thinking, reasoning and judgment.
Motivation for Being an Independent Board Member. What motivates a person to join
a board as an independent director? Compensation in the form of bonuses and stock
options can be a significant incentive. (Gutierrez, 2003) One model of human behavior
poses three classes of variables in determining human behavior (Jain and Triandis, 1990).
Social factors such as roles, norms, self concept and interpersonal agreements form one
class of variables. Act satisfaction associated with pleasurable activities is another class.
Finally, perceived consequences of performing the act is the third class.
Operations Experience. Just as it has been reported in the literature (Farris, 1982) that
basic knowledge of the underlying technology area has been found to be useful in the
success of a manager of knowledge workers in a technology area (resulting in more
innovation), so it is likely that a board member can exercise his/her fiduciary
responsibility in an improved manner if he/she is knowledgeable in the technology area
of the start-up. There is certainly merit to having independent board members who have
different backgrounds, such as legal, financial, technical, managerial and ethnicity.
Teamwork. It is imperative that the prospective board member demonstrate the ability to
handle group dynamics in a professional manner. A tendency to dominate meetings, be
vociferous or cantankerous can torpedo a board meeting.
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Time Requirements. Serving on a board can consume considerable time so
entrepreneurs should be aware of the contribution of possibly the most important asset a
professional has – his/her time. Frequently, independent directors have a full time job at
another company or organization and simply cannot afford more than that amount of time
per month.
BEST PRACTICES IN BOARD GOVERNANCE
Several best practices that are pertinent to high tech start-ups are the following. Several
of these practices are listed in Sherwin (2003):
1. Majority of directors are independent.
2. The Chair and CEO are separated.
3. Audit committee is composed entirely of independent directors, whose backgrounds
indicate a high degree of financial competence.
4. Board conducts annual performance review of management team.
5. Board has a CEO succession plan in place.
6. All committees chaired by independent directors.
7. Board membership exhibits diversity in experience, skills, backgrounds, gender and
ethnicity.
8. Trust, communications and teamwork are nurtured in board activities.
9. Review of strategic plan and annual financial plan happens at every board meeting.
10. Board meetings are planned with published agenda one week in advance with
targeted start and end times.
CHECKLIST FOR BOARD SELECTION AND CONCLUSIONS
As a result of the prior discussion the following ten assessment steps in Table 1 form a
guide for entrepreneurial teams in dealing with board member selection. The first seven
steps assess the board member candidate’s suitability for general board membership
while Steps 8-10 specifically deal with the issue of the start-up’s technology focus. There
is much activity, perhaps even turmoil, in the initial period of starting up a company.
Entrepreneurial teams are often eager to start the product or service development process
once funding is secured. It is easy to put off board member selection or relegate it to the
lead investor in the company. However, the ET may never be in such an advantageous
position again to help select the best available group of people who will perform
oversight of the company’s management and make other valuable contributions.
___________
Table 1
___________
Usage of Table 1 by an ET in assessing a board member candidate can also be modified
by assigning a “weight” to each attribute. For example, the absence of a board member
on the current board that exhibits strength in Step 4 may lead the ET to assign a higher
weight to Step 4 than to others. However, it is important that ET’s understand that no
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attribute can be ignored. Indeed, board candidates who rate poorly in Steps 3, 5 and 7 can
cause trouble far in excess of their potential positive contributions.
In summary, the selection of board members for new technology businesses is an
important step in laying the groundwork for a company’s success. The process of
selection should be seen by ET’s as a rare opportunity to strengthen the people assets of
the company. Choosing board members can very well rival the importance of choosing
key operational team members.
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Table 1
Assessment Steps for Selecting an Independent Board Member
in a High Tech Start-up
Step No.
1

Attribute
Business Experience

Areas
Marketing, Sales,
Strategy

2

Communication Skills

Active Listening
and Succinct
Verbalization

3

Ethics & Background

Impeccable ethical
background

4

Ability to “Open Doors”

5

No Conflict of Interest

Relationship with
Potential
customers,
suppliers, potential
investors
No significant
interest in
ownership or
financial
association

6

Time Availability

No more than 2
other board
memberships

7

Chemistry with Founders

8

Gen. Knowledge of
Technology
Specific Knowledge of
Company’s Technology

More so than age
difference,
interpersonal skill
is important
Career in
technology
User, Developer,
Researcher

9
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Comment
These areas are
probably most
useful to a start-up
Individual must be
able to “listen” to
the E-team’s issues
and not “overtalk.”
Avoid selection of
anyone with
questionable
reputation.
This is valuable
initial “capital” for
the start-up.

Too much potential
conflict will
necessitate
excusing the board
member from
deliberations
Regardless of other
virtues, absences
from deliberations
does disservice to
company
Difficulty in
relating to founding
team is a “no-no.”
A degree in
technology helps
User is most
needed for a start-
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Operational Knowledge of
Technology Companies

Executive of
functional area
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up
Sales and
Marketing of
Technology
products or services
most helpful

